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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Sections
8-2-2(3)0) & (4) and 78-2a-3(2)(k) of the Utah Code.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The sole issue for the Court to decide in this appeal is whether the trial court
rred by ruling that as a matter of law the trust empowered Herschel J. West, Sr. to quit
laim the real property to himself and his wife, Marilyn West, as joint tenants with full
ights of survivorship.
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact
exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because
entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, no deference is due the trial
:ourt's determination of the issues presented." Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d
31, 235 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted).

DETERMINATIVE LAW
"If two or more trustees are appointed to perform a trust, and if any of them is
mable or refuses to accept the appointment, or, having accepted, ceases to be a trustee,
he surviving or remaining trustees shall perform the trust and succeed to all the powers,
duties, and discretionary authority given to the trustees jointly." Section 78-7-405(2) of
he Utah Code.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A Nature of the Case.
This case is a dispute between Appellee, the personal representative of the Estate
of Herschel J. West, Sr., and Appellants, the remainder beneficiaries of a trust created
by Herschel J. West, Sr. and his first wife Hazel L. West. Appellee is the second wife of
Herschel J. West, Sr., and Appellants are the children of Herschel J. West, Sr. and Hazel
L. West. The corpus of the trust consists of real property, a residence occupied by
Appellee and Herschel J. West, Sr. until his death, and by Appellee thereafter.
Appellants mischaracterize the nature of this case and its central issue as whether
or not as a matter of law a trust created by multiple trustors becomes irrevocable upon
the death of one of the trustors in spite of the intent of the trustors as embodied in the
language of the trust. Appellants thereby overlook the plain language of the trust and
the ability of multiple trustors (as well as sole trustors) to define within the trust
instrument the power to revoke the trust or otherwise control the disposition of trust
property. Consequently, trusts must be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine
what powers have been established by the trustor(s) regarding the trust property.
Therefore, this case centers on the powers set forth in the trust instrument and
the ability of Herschel J. West, Sr. to dispose of the trust property by revocation,
consumption or otherwise.
B. Course of Proceedings.
On February 8,1993, Appellee, as Personal Representative (the trial court having
previously ordered the removal of Appellant Herschel J. West, Jr. as Personal
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Representative [R. at 270]), filed the Inventory for the Estate of Herschel J. West, Sr.
Probate No. 91-3400471). On or about April 6,1993, Appellants filed their Objection
o Inventory asserting that a number of items listed in the Inventory were held in various
rusts and therefore were not part of the estate. The subject real property was not listed
n the Inventory because Appellee believed that the property passed by operation of law
o her as the surviving joint tenant.
On November 1,1993, Appellants filed a Complaint (Civil No. 930400583) against
Vppellee seeking a declaration that title to the real property was vested in themselves as
>eneficiaries under a Declaration of Trust made by Herschel J. West, Sr. and Hazel L.
Afest, and claiming that the quit claim deed Herschel J. West Sr. had executed in favor
)f himself and Appellee was in violation of this Declaration of Trust. [R. at 18.] On
tfarch 2, 1994, Appellee filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on the grounds
hat even if the alleged trust was valid (which Appellee contended it was not), it was
>roperly revoked, or in the alternative, the real property was effectively disbursed to
ierschel J. West, Sr. [R. at 44 & 73.]
On May 25, 1994, Civil No. 930400583 was consolidated with Probate No. 911400471 [R. at 89.], and Appellee's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings regarding the
ubject trust was considered along with cross motions for Summary Judgment regarding
he validity of the alleged trusts identified by Appellants in their Objection to Inventory.
Appellee's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings was substantively treated as a Motion
or Summary Judgment pursuant to Rules 12(c) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
'rocedure.
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C. Disposition in the Trial CourtOn October 25, 1994, the trial court ruled that the subject trust was valid, but did
not address the issue of whether or not Herschel J. West, Sr. had effectively transferred
the real property out of the trust. [R. at 547.] (Appellants erroneously contend the
court awarded the real property to themselves. Appellants Brief at 7.) On November 2,
1994, Appellee filed a Request for Clarification of Ruling and Enlargement clarifying the
ultimate disposition of the real property. [R. at 550.] On or about December 15,1994,
Appellants filed a Request for Entry on Land and Inspection in an attempt to gain
access to the real property. [R. at 556.] On January 17,1995, the trial court clarified its
earlier ruling byfindingthat the trust was valid, but had been effectively revoked by
Herschel J. West, Sr. when he quit claimed the subject real property to himself and
Appellee; accordingly, Appellants' Request for Entry on Land and Inspection was
denied. [R. at 587.] A Final Judgment to this effect was issued on or about February 9,
1995. [R. at 590.]
D. Statement of the Facts.
1.

Herschel J. West, Sr. and Hazel L. West executed a Declaration of Trust

purporting to hold the real property in trust; the Declaration of Trust was notarized on
August 5,1986. (Appellants erroneously claim that the date of the creation of the trust
was July 18,1969. Appellants Brief at 6. July 18,1969 was the date the real property
was originally conveyed to Herschel J. West, Sr. and Hazel L. West. [R. at 41.])
2.

Herschel J. West, Sr. and Hazel L. West were co-trustees of the subject

trust, with the survivor to "continue as sole Trustee." [R. at 40.]

4

3.

Appellants were named as remainder beneficiaries of the trust [R. at 41.]

4.

The Declaration of Trust empowers the successor trustee to disburse to, or

for the benefit of, Herschel J. West, Sr. and Hazel L. West "such sums from income or
principal as appear necessary or desirable for [their] comfort or welfare." [R. at 41.]
5.

The Declaration of Trust empowers Herschel J. West, Sr. and Hazel L.

West "(1) to place a mortgage or other lien upon the property, (2) to collect any rental
or other income which may accrue from the trust property and to pay such income to
[themselves] as individuals." [R. at 40.]
6.

The Declaration of Trust "reserve[s] unto [Herschel J. West, Sr. and Hazel

L. West] the power and right at any time during [their] lifetime to amend or revoke in
whole or in part the trust

The sale or other disposition by [them] of the whole or

any part of the property held [thereunder] shall constitute as to such whole or part a
revocation of this trust." [R. at 40.]
7.

Hazel L. West died on June 19,1988. [R. at 45.]

8.

On November 18, 1989, Herschel J. West, Sr. married Appellee. [R. at

9.

On January 16, 1991, Herschel J. West, Sr. quit claimed the real property

14.]

:o himself and Appellee, as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship; this deed was
•ecorded the same day. [R. at 38.]
10.

Herschel J. West, Sr. died on December 11,1991. [R. at 17.]
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee

because reasonable minds could not differ regarding the power of Herschel J. West, Sr.
to properly transfer the real property out of the trust pursuant to any one of various
alternate theories.
II.

The Declaration of Trust fully empowered Herschel J. West, Sr. to revoke

the trust, and he properly did so by quit claiming the real property to himself and
Appellee. This is particularly so when the intent of the trustors is examined as expressed
in the various provisions of the trust instrument.
III.

The Declaration of Trust fully empowered Herschel J. West to disburse to

himself as much of the entire principal of the trust as was desirable for his comfort or
welfare, and he properly did so by quit claiming the real property to himself and
Appellee.
IV.

Appellee detrimentally relied on Herschel J. West, Sr.'s promise to transfer

the real property into the names of himself and Appellee as joint tenants with full rights
of survivorship, sold the home she had lived in prior to her marriage to Herschel J.
West, Sr., and maintained and made substantial improvements to the real property.
V.

Appellants' remaining arguments are irrelevant and do not apply to this

matter.

6

ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment in Favor of Appellee.
"A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of the facts in the record,

reasonable minds could differ." West One Trust Co. v. Morrison; 861 P.2d 1058,1060
(Utah Ct App. 1993) (citations omitted). All of the relevant facts as set forth above,
particularly the terms of the subject trust, were presented to the trial court. The trial
court properly concluded that the terms of the trust empowered Herschel J. West, Sr. to
revoke it. However, an appellate court "may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any
ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not reJied on below." Higgins v. Salt
Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted).
This Court may affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment based on
Herschel J. West, Sr.'s power to revoke the trust or his power to transfer the real
property out of the trust for his own comfort or welfare.
II.

The Declaration of Trust Fully Empowered Herschel J. West, Sr. to Revoke the
Trust After the Death of Hazel L. West
Aj.

The trust provisions provide for revocation.

Paragraph 5 of the trust plainly declares: "We reserve unto ourselves the power
and right at any time during our lifetime to amend or revoke in whole or in part the
trust hereby created without the necessity of obtaining the consent of any beneficiary and
without giving notice to any beneficiary. The sale or other disposition by us of the whole
or any part of the property held hereunder shall constitute as to such whole or part a
revocation of this trust." As the survivor of the two trustors, Herschel J. West, Sr. was
fully empowered by the trust to revoke it.
7

"[T]rust provisions are not to be construed in the abstract, but rather must be
viewed against the background of the entire document" Brenneman v. Bennett 420 F.2d
19, 23 (8th Cir. 1970) (applying Iowa law) (emphasis added); accord Rubinson v.
Rubinson. 620 N.E.2d 1271, 1276 (111. App. Ct. 1993). An examination of Paragraphs 1,
4, 6 and 7 of the subject trust reveals that these paragraphs are intended to be
designations of trustee powers, not those reserved to the trustors. Thus, Paragraph 5,
which is couched within the other trustee provisions, is logically interpreted as giving
Herschel J. West, Sr. and Hazel L. West the power as trustees to revoke the trust (which
would be the natural consequence of the exercise of their power to transfer trust
property). As the surviving trustee, Herschel J. West, Sr. had the power to exercise any
discretionary trustee powers that would have required the joint action by Herschel J.
West, Sr. and Hazel L. West while she was still alive and acting as a trustee. See
Declaration of Trust, Paragraph 7; Utah Code § 78-7-405(2).
It is entirely permissible for a trustor to provide in the terms of a trust that the
trustee has the power to revoke it. See Kline v. Utah Dept. of Health. 776 P.2d 57, 61
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Rubinson v. Rubinson. 620 N.E.2d 1271, 1280 (111. App. Ct 1993)
(There is a "long-settled rule and [a] plethora of cases that have held where the settlor
reserves the unrestricted power to amend a trust, or where the instrument vests such
power in the trustees, that power may be used to terminate the trust or, as here, change
the beneficiaries of the trust"); Landeau v. Landeau. 449 N.Y.S.2d 2, 2 (1982); George G.
Bogert & George T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 1000, at 314 (2d ed. rev.
1983).
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In Kline, the Department of Health asserted that the trustee of a trust had the
power to revoke a trust, so the corpus of the trust should be attributed to the trustor in
determining his eligibility for benefits. However, the court ruled that a trust is revocable
only to the extent such a power is set forth in the trust, and the particular trust did not
confer the power to revoke on the trustee. Kline, 776 P.2d at 61. It is noteworthy that
the court did not rule that a trustee could not be vested with the power to revoke a trust.
In Rubinson, the trustees were able to use the power granted to them under the
terms of the trust to cut off the interest of originally named beneficiaries (essentially the
same complaint made by Appellants in this case). Rubinson, 620 N.E.2d at 1280.
The above analysis would not change if Paragraph 4 of the subject trust vests the
power to revoke in the trustors rather than the trustees. Because Herschel J. West, Sr.
and Hazel L. West were both the trustors and trustees, it just doesn't matter which hat
Herschel J. West, Sr. was wearing when he revoked the trust-what is important is that
the express provisions of the trust empowered him to do so.
IJ.

The intent of the trustors as expressed in the
Declaration of Trust is that the survivor may revoke the trust

Appellants' sole argument at the trial court level regarding the propriety of
Herschel J. West, Sr.'s conveyance of the real property to himself and Appellee was that
a trust established by multiple trustors becomes irrevocable as a matter of law upon the
death of one of the trustors. [R. at 59 & 516.] Now, for the first time on appeal,
Appellants attempt to argue that the intent of the Herschel J. West, Sr. and Hazel L.
West was to create a trust for their children that would only be revocable during the
joint lifetime of the co-trustors. See Appellants Brief at 10-14.
9

An appellate court may "not consider arguments on appeal which were not raised
before the trial court." Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356,1358 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).
Not only have Appellants raised the above issue for the first time on appeal, but
they engage in pure speculation regarding the intent of Herschel J. West, Sr. and Hazel
L. West. When a "trust is based on a written instrument, the intention of the settlor[s]
must be ascertained from the language thereof, and the court may not go outside of the
language in an effort to give effect to what it thinks the intent was." Makoff v. Makoff,
528 P.2d 797, 798 (Utah 1974).
The crux of Appellants' intent argument is that the phrase "our lifetime" speaks in
the plural and requires that a particular power be exercised by both Herschel J. West, Sr.
and Hazel L. West while both are still alive. However, when the phrase "our lifetime" is
considered in isolation, as Appellants have viewed it, it is just as easily interpreted as
meaning the period of time during which either Herschel J. West, Sr. or Hazel L. West
are alive (particularly because no restrictive language such as "our joint lifetime" was
used). In fact, this latter interpretation is mandated when the phrase "our lifetime" is
considered in light of the manner in which it is repeatedly used in various provisions
throughout the trust instrument because the former interpretation would yield absurd
results.
The phrase "our lifetime" appears in four provisions of the subject trust.
Paragraph 1 of the trust states:
"If because of the physical or mental incapacity of both of us certified in
writing by a physician, the Successor Trustee hereinafter named shall
10

assume active administration of this trust during our lifetime, such
Successor Trustee shall be fully authorized to pay to us or disburse on our
behalf such sums from income or principal as appear necessary or desirable
for our comfort or welfare."
f Appellants' interpretation of the phrase "our lifetime" is applied to this provision, then
he Successor Trustee could no longer actively administer the trust after the death of one
)f the trustors, and the trust would be effectively left without a trustee until the death of
iie surviving trustor. Even more incredible is the fact that as long as both trustors are
alive but incapacitated, the income and principal of the trust may be used to care for the
two of them, however, if one of them dies this means of support is inexplicably taken
away from the surviving, but incapacitated, trustor. In fact, Herschel J. West, Sr.
arguably would have been required to vacate the real property upon the death of Hazel
L. West, inspite of the fact it was his only residence because no portion of the trust
corpus (principal or income) could be used for his comfort or welfare any longer.
Paragraph 4 of the trust states:
"We reserve unto ourselves the power and right during our lifetime (1) to
place a mortgage or other lien upon the property, (2) to collect any rental
or other income which may accrue from the trust property and to pay such
income to ourselves as individuals. We shall be exclusively entitled to all
income accruing from the trust property during our lifetime, and no
beneficiary named herein shall have any claim upon any such income
and/or profits distributed to us."
If Appellants' interpretation of the phrase "our lifetime" is applied to this provision, then
upon the death of one trustor, the surviving trustor is inexplicably no longer entitled to
any of the income from the trust property in spite of the fact that the trust does not
otherwise indicate that the remainder beneficiaries are entitled to receive any portion of
the trust property (income or principal) until the death of the survivor of the trustors.
11

Paragraph 6 of the trust states:
"The death during our lifetime, or in a common accident or disaster with
us, of all of the beneficiaries designated hereunder shall revoke such
designation, and in the former event, we reserve the right to designate a
new beneficiary. Should we for any reason fail to designate such new
beneficiary7, this trust shall terminate upon the death of the survivor of us
and the trust property shall revert to the estate of such survivor."
If Appellants' interpretation of the phrase "our lifetime" is applied to this provision, in
the event all of the beneficiaries died subsequent to the death of one of the trustors, the
surviving trustor would be powerless to designate a new beneficiary during their lifetime,
but inexplicably may effectively designate a new beneficiary in their will upon death
because the trust property will revert to their estate. No rational explanation can be
given for such a distinction between the survivor's ability to make an inter vivos vs.
testamentary designation of a new beneficiary.
Paragraph 5 of the trust states:
"We reserve unto ourselves the power and right at any time during our
lifetime to amend or revoke in whole or in part the trust hereby created
without the necessity of obtaining the consent of any beneficiary and
without giving notice to any beneficiary. The sale or other disposition by
us of the whole or any part of the property held hereunder shall constitute
as to such whole or part a revocation of this trust."
This is the only provision Appellants have referred to in arguing that the phrase "our
lifetime" means the period of time during which both Herschel J. West, Sr. and Hazel L.
West are still alive. However, when all of the trust provisions are viewed as a whole,
Appellants' interpretation is ludicrous-upon the death of one of the trustors the
surviving trustor would no longer derive any benefit whatsoever from the trust (income
or principal), and the trust would effectively be left without a trustee, yet the trust would
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lot terminate and the remainder beneficiaries would not benefit from the trust until the
surviving trustor died.
The only logical interpretation that can be consistently applied to the phrase "our
ifetime" is that this phrase was intended to refer to the period of time during which any
)ne of the trustors was alive and capable of acting as set forth in the various trust
provisions.
C

Appellants' reliance on cases from other jurisdictions
is misplaced.

The cases relied upon by Appellants for the proposition that a trust created by
nultiple trustors becomes irrevocable as a matter of law upon the death of one trustor
[see Appellants' Brief at 21-22) do not stand for any such proposition. In virtually every
single case cited by Appellants for this legal proposition, the court focused on the intent
3f the trustors rather than an abstract principle of law that any trust created by multiple
trustors automatically becomes irrevocable as a matter of law upon the death of one of
the trustors. Furthermore, each of these cases are factually distinguishable from the case
at hand.
In Khan v. Khan. 214 Cal. Rptr. 109 (Ct. App. 1985), a husband and wife as
trustors and trustees held real estate in trust for their children with the income to go to
the husband and wife during their lifetime. However, the husband attempted to
unilaterally revoke the trust while the wife was still alive, and the court ruled that he
could not do so. Khan. 214 Cal. Rptr. at 112. In contrast, Herschel J. West, Sr. revoked
the subject trust after Hazel L. West had died. In fact, Khan actually supports
Appellee's position. The court in Khan recognized that multiple trustors can provide any
13

mode of revocation. Khan. 214 Cal. Rptr. at 112. The court in Khan further explained,
"The subject declarations of trust did not provide that either trustee could act alone,
except upon death or incapacity of the other." Khan. 214 Cal. Rptr. at 111 n.4 (emphasis
added).
In In re Race's Trust 169 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1957) (referred to as In re Chemical
Corn Exchange Bank, by Appellants), a husband and wife had created four separate
trusts with different provisions regarding revocability. The issue was whether one of the
four trusts was revocable by the survivor. The court in In re Race's Trust explained:
"Whether an express trust may be revoked, altered or amended depends upon the
wording of the trust instrument relating thereto." In re Race's Trust 169 N.Y.S.2d at
602. The court ultimately found that the language contemplated action by both the
husband and the wife in contrast to the provision in one of the other four trusts created
by the husband and wife that clearly gave the power to revoke to the survivor. In re
Race's Trust 169 N.Y.S.2d at 601-02. Similarly, by looking at the wording of the subject
trust, and construing its' provisions as a whole, it is clear that Herschel J. West, Sr. and
Hazel L. West intended the survivor to have the ability to revoke the subject trust.
In Culver v. Title Guaranty & Trust Co.. 58 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1945), a husband and
wife and a third party created a trust, the income of which was to go to the husband for
life, then to the wife for life if she survived the husband, and then the principal of the
trust was to be distributed to a person designated by the third party, or, if no designation
is made, to the issue of the third party. However, no power of revocation whatsoever
was reserved in the trust instrument. Culver. 58 N.Y.S.2d at 117. The issue in Culver
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as whether the husband and wife could terminate the trust, after the death of the third
ustor, pursuant to a statute which required the consent of all grantors and beneficiarieshe court held that they could not Culver, 58 N.Y.S.2d at 119. Unlike the above trust,
le subject trust expressly sets forth a power of revocation, which is unaffected by any
Jtah statute.
In Noble v. Rogan. 49 F. Supp. 370 (S.D. Cal. 1943) (applying Pennsylvania law),
husband and wife created a trust, the income of which was to go to their daughter for
fe-notably, the husband and wife would derive no benefit from the trust even while
ley were alive. Noble. 49 F. Supp. at 370. The focus of the court's inquiry wras on the
item of the trustors. The court in Noble found that the survivor was not given any
ontrol over the trust, and that the trustors intended that any revocation be made by
loth the husband and wife jointly. Noble, 49 F. Supp. at 372. In contrast, the subject
rust was specifically created for the sole benefit of the trustors, to the exclusion of the
emainder beneficiaries, while the trustors were alive, and the survivor was given
omplete control over the subject trust.
In Croker v. Croker. 192 N.Y.S. 666 (1921), a husband and wife created a trust,
he income of which was paid to the husband and wife, or the survivor of them, for life,
ind upon the death of the survivor the trust property was to pass to their children,
-lowever, at the time the trust was created, the husband and wife were living apart and
considerable trust property had belonged to the wife. The court in Croker focused on
he intent of the trustors, and based in part on the above facts found that the intent of
lie trustors was to provide for the wife during her life, and then to give the trust
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property to their children. Croker, 192 N.Y.S. at 669. No such circumstances exist which
indicate a similar intent in the creation of the subject trust
III.

The Declaration of Trust Fully Empowered Herschel J. West, Sr. to Disburse Any
Portion of the Trust Income or Principal, Up to the Whole Thereof, For His
Comfort and Welfare.
Paragraph 1 of the trust specifically empowers the successor trustee to "pay to [the

trustors] or disburse on [their] behalf such sums from income or principal as appear
necessary or desirable for their comfort or welfare." Surely the successor trustee would
not be given any broader powers than those given to Herschel J. West, Sr. and Hazel L.
West as the original trustees. Thus, as the surviving trustee, Herschel J. West, Sr. had
the full power and authority to transfer any principal out of the trust, namely the real
property, that he desired for his comfort and welfare~and he properly did so.
Hazel L. West's death did not impair Herschel J. West, Sr.'s ability to transfer the
real property out of the trust as the sole surviving trustee. Paragraph 7 of the trust
states: "In the event of the . . . death of one of us, the survivor shall continue as sole
Trustee." Furthermore, Section 78-7-405(2) of the Utah Code states: "If two . . . trustees
are appointed to perform a trust, and if any of them . . . ceases to be a trustee, the
surviving or remaining trusteef] shall perform the trust and succeed to all the powers,
duties, and discretionary authority given to the trustees jointly1' (emphasis added). In
spite of Hazel L. West's death, Herschel J. West, Sr. still had the power to transfer any
principal out of the trust that he desired for his comfort or welfare.
Appellants have completely failed to address (at both the trial court level and
here on appeal) Herschel J. West, Sr.'s ability to transfer the real property out of the
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ust for his comfort or welfare pursuant to Paragraph 1 of the trust. Consequently, this
rgument stands completely uncontroverted and provides sufficient grounds in and of
self for affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee.
V.

Appellee Detrimentally Relied on Herschel J. West, Sr.'s Promise to Transfer the
Real Property Into the Names of Himself and Appellee as Joint Tenants with Full
Rights of Survivorship.
Prior to her marriage to Herschel J. West, Sr., Appellee owned a home in which

tie resided. In reliance upon Herschel J. West, Sr.'s promise to transfer their residence
ito the names of himself and Appellee as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship,
tie sold her former residence and used the proceeds to maintain, and make substantial
nprovements to the subject real property. [R. at 577.] If Appellants were awarded the
eal property outright, they would be unjustly enriched to the extent that Appellee has
ised the proceeds from her former home for the benefit of the real property.
The trial court did not reach this issue because it found that the trust had
properly been revoked, and consequently Appellee owned the real property outright. If
his court were to find that for some reason the real property remained in the trust and
LOW belongs to Appellants, this matter should be remanded to the trial court for a
letermination of this particular issue.
/.

Appellants' Remaining Arguments are Irrelevant to the Issue Presented on
Appeal.
Appellants' Brief contains many red herrings and arguments which are completely

rrelevant to the issue presented on appeal. For example, Appellee has never contended
hat Herschel J. West, Sr. terminated the trust pursuant to the mutual agreement of the
xustors and trustees as set forth in Clayton v. Behle. 565 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1977) and
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Sundquist v. SundquisL 639 P.2d 181 (Utah 1981). See Appellants' Brief, at 25-27.
Additionally, Appellee has never contended that Herschel J. West, Sr. exercised any
revocation power on behalf of Hazel L. West as the executor of her estate. See
Appellants' Brief, at 20-21.
Appellants also allege that the quit claim deed executed by Herschel J. West, Sr.
conveying the real property to himself and Appellee as joint tenants with full rights of
survivorship was not recorded until after his death, thereby nullifying this purported
transfer completely. See Appellants' Brief, at 27. However, there is absolutely no
factual basis for this contention whatsoever, and Appellants do not even attempt to cite
to any portion of the record for support. This deed was recorded on January 16,1991.
[R. at 38.] Herschel J. West, Sr. did not die until nearly a year later on December 11,
1991. [R. at 17.]
Appellee urges this court to look past Appellants' irrelevant arguments, and focus
on the issue presented on appeal-whether or not Herschel J. West, Sr. was empowered
by the provisions of the trust to convey the real property to himself and Appellee as joint
tenants with full rights of survivorship.

CONCLUSION
Herschel J. West, Sr. was fully empowered by the provisions of the trust to convey
the real property to himself and Appellee as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship.
This power derived from his ability to revoke the trust and/or his ability to disburse the
entire trust corpus (the real property) to himself for his comfort and welfare.
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msequently, Appellee respectfully requests this court to affirm the trial court's grant of
nmary judgment in her favor. In the event that this court finds that for some reason,
>pellants are entitled to the real property, Appellee respectfully requests this court to
nand this matter to the trial court for a determination of the detrimental reliance and
just enrichment issue regarding Appellee's use of the proceeds from her former home
r the benefit of the real property which is now her residence.
ADDENDUM
No addendum is necessary.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this£3£>day of November, 1995.
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